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Unpatriotic Profit: How For-Profit Colleges
Target Veterans and What the Government
Must Do
to Stop Them
Christopher J. Salemme
I. INTRODUCTION
Veterans in the United States today are easy prey for
corporations looking to make a profit from federal government
funds intended to help these veterans become educated and
gainfully employed in the private sector. For-profit educational
institutions promise career advancement, practical technical
skills, and easy online access to their programs. Yet a veteran
like Mark Glogouski, who enrolled in the for-profit Colorado
Technical University 1 in 2011, remains in his original job as an
aircraft painter, but with “two associates’ degrees that aren’t in
the field [he] wanted, an unfinished bachelor’s degree, no more
veteran benefits and $65,000 in federal student loan debt.” 2
When Corinthian Colleges went out of business following a
U.S. Department of Education investigation into its deceptive
advertising practices, 3 Marine Corps veteran and Corinthian

1. Colorado Technical University markets itself as a “military-friendly university” and
provides “Military Education Benefits Specialists . . . to help [service members] navigate [their]
education benefits and financial aid.” Military-Friendly Online College, COLO. TECH. UNIV.,
http://www.coloradotech.edu/military (last visited June 20, 2017).
2. David Olinger, Veterans Feel Ripped Off by Colorado For-Profit College, COLO.
INDEP. (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.coloradoindependent.com/163650/veterans-colorado-techfor-profit-college-debt.
3. “Following enforcement actions by the federal government and other authorities,
Corinthian Colleges, Inc., sold most of its schools and later closed the remaining ones.”
Information About Debt Relief for Corinthian Colleges Students, FED. STUDENT AID,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/announcements/Corinthian (last visited June 20, 2017).

89

SALEMME.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BYU Journal of Public Law

1/19/2018 2:46 PM

[Vol. 32

student Paul Fajardo’s GI Bill housing benefits were revoked,
forcing him to live out of his car. 4 Navy veteran Robert
Velasquez was enrolled at the Retail Ready Career Center in
Garland, Texas, until it abruptly shut down in September
2017. 5 Velasquez now “question[s] why [he] believed the
school’s aggressive sales pitch to him that sounded ‘too good to
be true.’” 6
Considered the finest fighting force in world history, the
Armed Forces of the United States of America credits its
success “not [to] tanks, planes or ships, [but to its] People. . . .
They are your sons and daughters, brothers and sisters,
husbands and wives. People of whom we are very proud. These
are the best of America.” 7 The value of the American men and
women who selflessly serve their nation is unparalleled;
however, the protections afforded to veterans by the federal
government are not always sufficient to meet the injustices they
face in the civilian world. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that
began early in the twenty-first century are far less active than
they were a few years ago. 8 Today, there are approximately
11,000 American service members in Afghanistan, down from
100,000 in 2010, and 5,765 service members in Iraq, down
from 170,000 in 2007. 9 Thus, veterans seeking post-military
4. Chris Kirkham & Alan Zarembo, For-Profit Colleges Are Using the GI Bill to
Make Money Off Veterans, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-

fi-for-profit-colleges-gi-bill-20150809-story.html.
5. Eva-Marie Ayala, Hundreds of Veterans Scramble After Garland For-Profit College
Closes, DALLAS NEWS (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/education/2017/09/
28/hundreds-veterans-scramble-garland-profit-college-closes.
6. Id.
7. Our Most Important Resource, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
http://www.defense.gov/About-DoD/DoD-101#Our%20Most%2 0Important%20Rescource
(last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
8. Helene Cooper, U.S. to Send 600 More Troops to Iraq to Help Retake Mosul from
ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/world/middleeast/oba
ma-troops-iraq.html; Greg Jaffe & Missy Ryan, Obama Outlines Plan to Keep 5,500 Troops in
Afghanistan, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/na
tional-security/obama-expected-to-announce-new-plan-to-keep-5500-troops-inafghanistan/2015/10/14/d98f06fa-71d3-11e5-8d930af317ed58c9_story.html?utm_term=.99879b327685.
9. Ryan Browne, Pentagon Revises Number of Troops in Afghanistan, Disclosing
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employment are also seeking educational opportunities to
better qualify them for civilian jobs. 10
The private sector has taken note. For-profit
educational institutions saw a significant increase in veteran
enrollment between 2009 and 2013, while their civilian
enrollment declined. 11 In 2014, one notable for-profit college
company, University of Phoenix, received $345 million in
federal educational funds for veterans as it enrolled
approximately 50,000 veterans from the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq. 12 Veterans are heavily—and often unscrupulously—
recruited by for-profit institutions (“FPIs”) because education
benefits provided to veterans under existing law do not qualify
as standard, Department of Education-administered, federal
educational assistance programs, and therefore the revenue that
can be generated from veterans is unlimited. 13 This article
explores the for-profit education industry, its history of
deceitful recruitment of veterans, the federal government’s
attempts at reform, and what steps need to be taken by the
Trump administration and Congress to protect veterans and
taxpayer dollars from private industry exploitation.

2,600 More, CNN (Aug. 30, 2017, 4:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/30/politics/usrevises-number-troops-afghanistan/index.html; Mark Thompson, Number of U.S. Troops in
Iraq Keeps Creeping Upward, TIME (Apr. 18, 2016), http://time.com/4298318/iraq-us-

troops-barack-obama-mosul-isis/.
10. See Eric Westervelt, For-Profit Colleges Seeking Veterans’ GI Bill Dollars Aren’t
Always the Best Fit, NPR: NPRED (Jan. 29, 2016, 7:06 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2
016/01/29/464579497/veterans-to-higher-ed-big-room-for-improvement.
11. Elizabeth Jones, New Report Shows Nearly $2 Billion in GI Bill Funds Go to ForProfit Colleges, PBS NEWSHOUR (July 30, 2014, 5:11 PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/education/new-report-shows-nearly-2-billion-of-gi-bill-fundsgo-to-for-profit-colleges.
12. Aaron Glantz, University of Phoenix Sidesteps Obama Order on Recruiting
Veterans, REVEAL (June 30, 2015), https://www.revealnews.org/article/university-of-phoenixsidesteps-obama-order-on-recruiting-veterans/.
13. See infra notes 58–65 and accompanying text.
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II. FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION

A. Higher Education Systems in the United States
Higher education institutions in the United States can
be broken down into three economic categories: public, nonprofit, and for-profit. Public universities, as their name
indicates, are generally owned and operated by state
governments who charge their state residents lower tuition than
out-of-state residents. Some of these universities date back to
the eighteenth century, with Georgia being the first state to
charter a university in 1785, 14 followed by the chartering of the
University of North Carolina in 1789. 15 Non-profit universities
in the United States predate public universities, and even the
independence and establishment of the nation. 16 Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code defines the non-profit
status, and therefore tax exempt status, of these privately owned
institutions as corporations that are “organized and operated
exclusively for . . . educational purposes.” 17 The Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) further requires of these entities that:
[N]o part of the net earnings . . . inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual,
no substantial part of the activities of which is
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting,
to influence legislation . . . and which does not
participate in, or intervene in . . . any political

14. History of UGA, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA. (July 11, 2011),
http://www.uga.edu/profile/history/.
15. First Public University in the United States, THE CAROLINA STORY: A VIRTUAL
MUSEUM U. HIST., https://museum.unc.edu/exhibits/show/davie/silhouette1820 (last visited
Oct. 20, 2016).
16. See About Harvard, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, http://www.harvard.edu/aboutharvard (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) (“Established in 1636, Harvard is the oldest institution of
higher education in the United States.”).
17. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
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campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office. 18

Although many non-profit private universities generate
millions of dollars in revenue annually 19 and some have multibillion-dollar endowments, 20 they are in accordance with
section 501(c)(3) so long as they operate with an educational,
rather than profit-driven, purpose.
However, the third category of higher education
institutions do have a profit-based purpose and do not qualify
for tax-exempt status with the IRS. These institutions may
operate entirely online, as traditional campus-based
universities, or a hybrid of the two. 21 They distinguish
themselves from non-profit universities by treating their
students as customers and operating on a business model with
financial growth as their primary goal. 22 Frequently criticized
by academics 23 and government agencies, 24 FPIs are still able to
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., NW. UNIV., 2013 FINANCIAL REPORT 1 (2014), http://www.northwester
n.edu/financial-operations/annual-financial-reports/2013-Financial-Report.pdf (In FY 2013,
Northwestern University’s “[t]otal assets grew to $10.9 billion, an increase of more than
$1 billion
from
the
previous year.”); VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, 2015 FINANCIAL REPORT 5 (2015), https://financ
e.vanderbilt.edu/report/FY2015-FinancialReport.pdf (noting that in FY 2015, “the university’s
total net assets increased $132 million to [$5.975 billion]”).
20. Katherine N. Lapp & Paul J. Finnegan, Financial Overview from the Executive Vice
President and the Treasurer, in HARVARD UNIVERSITY, FINANCIAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR
2014,
at
3,
3
(Nov.
7,
2014), http://finance.harvard.edu/files/fad/files/har_fy14_financialreport.pdf (Harvard’s endow
me-nt after FY 2014 amounted to $36.4 billion).
21. See RICHARD L. ALFRED, MANAGING THE BIG PICTURE IN COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES: FROM TACTICS TO STRATEGY 189 (2006).
22. Id. at 189–90; JAMES COLEMAN & RICHARD VEDDER, CTR. FOR COLLEGE
AFFORDABILITY & PRODUCTIVITY, FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A
PRIMER 11 (May 2008).
23. See generally Amanda Harmon Cooley, The Need for Legal Reform of the ForProfit Educational Industry, 79 TENN. L. REV. 515 (2012); Menesha Mannapperuma,

Protecting Students, Protecting Consumers: A New Federal Regulation of the For-Profit
Distance Learning Industry, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 541 (2015).
24. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-948T, FOR-PROFIT

COLLEGES: UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND
ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES 2 (2010) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT].
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maintain profitability by selling themselves as career-oriented
and a cost-effective means for students to learn practical job
skills. 25 While the continued growth of the Internet and online
education has resulted in the increased prevalence of for-profit
education, the concept dates back centuries. 26 In the United
States, FPIs saw significant growth during the nineteenth
century, especially in the business education sector. 27

B. For-Profit Education Today
By 2005, over one million students in the United States
were enrolled in FPIs, with an average annual growth rate of
eleven percent since 1976. 28 Larger umbrella corporations, such
as Education Management Corporation, often own and operate
these schools as subsidiaries like a company would in any other
market. 29 The internet has allowed for the rapid growth of FPIs
as students can enroll and take classes from anywhere in the
world and there are no physical enrollment limits that a
traditional classroom would have. Two of the largest FPIs,
DeVry University 30 and University of Phoenix, 31 offer classes in
dozens of degree programs online and on campuses across the
United States. 32
With a profit-driven objective, FPIs are forced to
competitively price their programs. They earn far less revenue
per student than traditional, non-profit public and private

25. ALFRED, supra note 21.
26. COLEMAN & VEDDER, supra note 22, at 5.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 6 Figures 1, 9.
29. See About Us, EDUC. MGMT. CORP., http://www.edmc.edu/About/ (last visited
Oct. 26, 2016).
30. See Our Heritage, DEVRY UNIVERSITY, http://www.devry.edu/communitynetwork/our-heritage.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2016).
31. See UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, CONSUMER INFO. GUIDE 2017–2018, at 1–3
(2017), http://www.phoenix.edu/content/dam/altcloud/doc/about_uopx/ConsumerInformation-Guide.pdf
32. UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, supra note 31; Our Heritage, supra note 30.
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universities, and receive on average only five dollars per student
in government support, whereas nonprofits receive on average
over seven thousand dollars per student. 33 Therefore, FPIs must
also balance their fiscally competitive edge with the necessity of
earning a profit. Ninety percent of their revenue is generated
by student fees, meaning that without donors or substantial
government assistance, they must reduce expenses to maintain
profitability. 34
Recruiting students and maintaining low costs has led
FPIs to aggressively market their product as an affordable,
career-driven, and legitimate alternative to traditional
institutions. In 2010, and in light of billions of dollars in federal
loans being spent at FPIs annually, the Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) conducted an investigation into
the marketing practices of fifteen FPIs. 35 Investigators
presented themselves as prospective students seeking to enroll
in one of several different types of degree programs offered by
the schools. 36 Of the fifteen FPIs, four encouraged the
undercover investigators to falsify federal student aid
documentation in order to receive federal benefits. 37 For
example, in direct violation of reporting requirements for
federal aid, “[a] financial aid officer at a privately owned college
in Texas told [a GAO] undercover applicant not to report
$250,000 in savings, stating that it was not the government’s
business how much money the undercover applicant had in a
bank account.” 38
Additionally, FPIs have been defendants in at least
twenty lawsuits under the False Claims Act (“FCA”). 39 The
FCA creates civil liability for any person who knowingly makes
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

COLEMAN & VEDDER, supra note 22, at 11.

Id.

GAO REPORT, supra note 24.

Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.

Cooley, supra note 23, at 534.
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“a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” or “a false
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim” 40 in
an effort to defraud the federal government. 41 Barring
mitigating circumstances for reduced liability, 42 defendants are
subject to a civil penalty of up to three times the damages
sustained by the government plus five to ten thousand dollars. 43
Actions under the FCA may only be brought by the United
States Department of Justice, or by a private person, state, or
local government (possibly as a co-plaintiff with the
Department of Justice) in a Qui Tam action. 44
In one example of an FCA action being brought against
an FPI, the University of Phoenix was alleged to have violated
the federal ban 45 on incentive compensation for recruiters by
making “false promises to comply with the incentive
compensation ban in order to become eligible to receive Title
IV funds.” 46 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California originally granted the defendant’s motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 47 However, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the
plaintiffs properly alleged the elements of liability under the
False Claims Act: “(1) a false statement or fraudulent course of
conduct, (2) made with scienter, (3) that was material, causing
(4) the government to pay out money or forfeit moneys due.
The question remaining is whether relators in this case have
alleged facts satisfying all four of these elements.” 48
40. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a) (2012).
41. See id. § 3729(b).
42. See id. § 3729(a)(2).
43. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(g).
44. Id. § 3730.
45. See 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a) (20) (“The institution will not provide any commission,
bonus, or other incentive payment based directly or indirectly on success in securing
enrollments or financial aid to any persons or entities engaged in any student recruiting or
admission activities or in making decisions regarding the award of student financial assistance. .
. .”).
46. United States v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2006).
47. See id. at 1168.
48. Id. at 1174, 1177–78.
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The for-profit education industry has further been
accused of exploiting veterans in especially egregious ways:
[S]ome institutions have recruited veterans with
serious
brain
injuries
and
emotional
vulnerabilities without providing academic
support and counseling; encouraged service
members and veterans to take out costly
institutional loans rather than encouraging them
to apply for Federal student loans first; engaged
in misleading recruiting practices on military
installations; and failed to disclose meaningful
information that allows potential students to
determine whether the institution has a good
record of graduating service members, veterans,
and their families and posi-tioning them for
success in the workforce. 49
In a prime example of how dedicated FPIs are to luring
veterans to their programs, the University of Phoenix was
recently found to be distributing commemorative coins with
the University logo on one side and the insignias of each
branch of the armed forces on the other on military
installations. 50 Challenge coins, as these coins are often called in
military culture, are “a form of recognition of the hard work
and excellence an individual has displayed” and are usually
distributed by unit commanders or senior non-commissioned
officers. 51 In using official military insignias with the
institution’s logo as a marketing tool, University of Phoenix not
only showed disrespect for the military tradition of challenge
49.
50.

Exec. Order No. 13607, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,861 (Apr. 27, 2012).
Dan Sagalyn, Pentagon Puts For-Profit University of Phoenix on Probation, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Oct. 9, 2015, 7:06 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/pentagon-putsprofit-university-phoenix-probation/.
51. Cf. Deana Heitzman, 31st Fighter Wing Pub. Affairs, Challenge Coins: A Tradition
of Excellence, U.S.A.F. (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Arti
cle/ 584692/challenge-coins-a-tradition-of-excellence.aspx.
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coins, but was also found to be in violation of Department of
Defense policy and was subsequently put on “probation.” 52
However, the Department of Defense does allow the
University of Phoenix to advertise its programs on military
installations with permission and at a cost. 53 At Fort Campbell,
Kentucky, the corporation paid $250,000 over three years to
sponsor eighty-nine events. 54
III. VETERANS’ EDUCATION BENEFITS
Educational financial assistance for veterans and their
families is primarily administered by the United States
Department of Veterans Affairs through several programs, for
which eligibility is generally dependent on when the veteran
served and for how long. Of these programs, the largest in
effect today are the Veterans’ Educational Assistance
Program, 55 (“VEAP”), the All-Volunteer Force Educational
Assistance Program, 56 (“Montgomery GI Bill”), and the Post9/11 Educational Assistance Program, 57 (“Post-9/11 GI
Bill”). 58 Enacted in 1976, VEAP provides educational assistance
to service members who enlisted between December 31, 1976,
and July 1, 1985. 59 The program aimed “to assist young men
and women in obtaining an education they might not otherwise
be able to afford” while also encouraging future enlistment. 60 At
the conclusion of VEAP’s eligibility window, Congress enacted

52. Sagalyn, supra note 50.
53. Aaron Glantz, University of Phoenix Gained Special Access to Military Base—For a
Price, REVEAL (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.revealnews.org/blog/university-of-phoenix-gainedspecial-access-to-military-base-for-a-price/.
54. Id.
55. 38 U.S.C. §§ 3201–3243 (2012).
56. Id. §§ 3001–3036.
57. 38 C.F.R. pt. 21, subpt. P (2009).
58. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL 857 (Barton F. Stichman, Ronald B. Abrams &
Louis J. George eds., 2014 ed. 2014).
59. 38 U.S.C. § 3201 (2012).
60. Id.
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the Montgomery GI Bill to continue providing service
members with educational assistance to ease their transition to
civilian life and allow them to take advantage of highereducation opportunities they otherwise might not be able to
afford. 61 Those eligible under the GI Bill must have begun their
service after June 30, 1995, and must have served at least two
years on active duty status. 62 The most-recently enacted
program is the Post-9/11 GI Bill—a program for veterans who
served at least thirty-six months on active duty and began their
service on or after September 11, 2001. 63
Educational assistance programs for veterans, while
complex in nature, are vast and apply to many different
educational opportunities veterans may seek. The Post-9/11 GI
Bill, for example, offers tuition assistance that starts at covering
forty percent of expenses for veterans who, after September 11,
2001, served between ninety days and six months on active
duty, and up to one hundred percent of expenses for veterans
who served at least thirty-six months on active duty or were
discharged for a service-related disability after serving at least
thirty continuous days. 64

IV. THE 90/10 RULE
A. The Rule
Through empty promises of strong career prospects
after completion of their programs, FPIs recruit veterans in
astonishing numbers. 65 DeVry University, for example,
“advertise[d] that 90 percent of its graduates seeking
61. 38 U.S.C. § 3001 (2012).
62. Montgomery GI Bill Active Duty (MGIB-AD), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, https://www.benefits.va.gov/gibill/mgib_ad.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2016).
63. 38 U.S.C. § 3311(b) (2012).
64. DEP’T OF VET. AFFAIRS, POST-9/11 GI BILL: IT’S YOUR FUTURE (May 2012),
http://www.benefits.va.gov/gibill/docs/pamphlets/ch33_pamphlet.pdf.
65. See Westervelt, supra note 10.

99

SALEMME.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BYU Journal of Public Law

1/19/2018 2:46 PM

[Vol. 32

employment found jobs in their field within six months of
graduation.” 66 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed
suit against DeVry for this allegedly deceptive advertisement,
and also for its claim “that its graduates had 15 percent higher
incomes one year after graduation on average than the
graduates of all other colleges or universities.” 67 A settlement
agreement between the FTC and DeVry was reached in
December 2016 in which DeVry agreed to “pay $49.4 million
in cash to be distributed to qualifying students who were
harmed by the deceptive ads, as well as $50.6 million in debt
relief.” 68
Of course, with the veterans recruited by FPIs comes
revenue from federal educational assistance programs like the
GI Bill, and in fiscal year 2012–2013, twenty-five percent of GI
Bill funds were paid to just eight FPIs 69 and totaled $1.7 billion
just from Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits. 70 FPIs recruit veterans so
heavily, in part, because of what has become known as the
“90/10 Rule.” 71 This rule, established in an amendment to the
Higher Education Act in 2008, requires that FPIs “derive not
less than ten percent of such institution’s revenues from sources

Merrit Kennedy, For-Profit DeVry University Is Sued Over Employment Figure
NPR (Jan. 27, 2016, 4:57 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/01/27/464599226/for-profit-devry-university-is-sued-over-employment-figureclaims.
67. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Brings Enforcement Action Against
DeVry University (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/01/ftcbrings-enforcement-action-against-devry-university; see also Complaint for Permanent
Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. DeVry Educ. Grp. Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00579MWF-SS (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2016).
68. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, DeVry University Agrees to $100 Million
Settlement with FTC (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2016/12/devry-university-agrees-100-million-settlement-ftc; see also Stipulated Order
for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment, FTC v. DeVry Educ. Grp. Inc., No. 2:16cv-00579-MWF-SS (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2016) (imposing additional advertising, training, and
reporting requirements on DeVry).
69. Id.
70. Jones, supra note 11.
71. See Jaclyn Patton, Comment, Encouraging Exploitation of the Military by ForProfit Colleges: The New GI Bill and the 90/10 Rule, 54 S. Tex. L. Rev. 425, 426 (2012).
66.

Claims,
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other than funds provided under [Title 20].” 72 Therefore, no
more than ninety percent of an FPI’s revenue may come from
traditional federal education assistance programs. 73
Veterans educational assistance programs do not fall
under Title 20 of the United States Code, however. 74 After an
FPI’s revenue reaches that ninety percent threshold, it can still
take advantage of federal money through the recruitment of
veterans to fill that remaining ten percent. 75

B. Initiatives
The deceptive and ill-willed tactics of the for-profit
education industry have not gone unnoticed. In 2012, President
Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13607 “in order to
ensure that Federal military and veterans educational benefits
programs are providing service members, veterans, spouses, and
other family members with the information, support, and
protections they deserve.” 76 The Order required the formation
of “Principles of Excellence”— a series of standards for
educational institutions receiving funds through veteran
assistance programs that would provide additional oversight of
FPIs’ recruitment and enrollment of veterans. 77 Specifically, the
Principles of Excellence were intended to ensure veterans are
provided with the necessary information related to the
educational programs, end the inappropriate recruitment
efforts by FPIs on military installations, and end deceptive
online marketing targeted at veterans and service members. 78
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

20 U.S.C. § 1094(a) (24) (2012).

See id.; Patton, supra note 71.
See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1094; 38 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3036, 3201–3243, 3311.
See Westervelt, supra note 10.
Exec. Order No. 13607, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,861 (Apr. 27, 2012).

Id. at 25, 861–25, 862.
Id.; Press Release, The White House, We Can’t Wait: President Obama Takes
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These new standards require FPIs to do the following:
(1) use a “standardized form . . . to help those prospective
students understand the total cost of the educational program”
and how much would be covered by military and veteran
programs; (2) “end fraudulent and unduly aggressive recruiting
techniques on and off military installations, as well as
misrepresentation, payment of incentive compensation, and
failure to meet State authorization requirements;” (3) readmit
active and reserve service members who are forced to take a
leave of absence from their education to perform service
obligations; (4) refund tuition to students who withdraw before
the completion of their course of study; (5) ensure that service
members and veterans using federal funds for the educational
program understand the program’s completion requirements;
and (6) “designate a point of contact for academic and financial
advising (including access to disability counseling) to assist
service member and veteran students and their families with the
successful completion of their studies and with their job
searches.” 79
The Principles, delegated to the Secretaries of
Education, Veterans Affairs, and Defense for implementation,
also delegated enforcement authority to those secretaries and
their respective departments. 80 A centralized system was thus
formed where veterans can file complaints about educational
institutions which may have violated federal laws or
regulations. 81 Complaints thought to have a well-founded basis
are then referred to the Department of Justice for civil or
criminal enforcement against the suspect institutions. 82 To

Action to Stop Deceptive and Misleading Practices by Educational Institutions that Target
Veterans,
Service
Members and Their Families (Apr. 26, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/04/26/we-can-t-wait-president-obama-takes-action-stop-deceptive-and-misleading.
79. Exec. Order No. 13607, 77 Fed. Reg. 25, 862 (Apr. 27, 2012).
80. Id. at 25,863.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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combat the incidences of FPIs illegally recruiting service
members on military installations, the Order requires the
Department of Defense to issue new rules pertaining to access
of military installations, and to require that only those
institutions that enter into a memorandum of agreement with
the Department of Defense will be permitted such access. 83
Also in furtherance of President Obama’s Principles of
Excellence, the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Education,
and Defense collaboratively launched the GI Bill Feedback
System. 84 Complaints received under the GI Bill Feedback
System are categorized as either serious or flagrant, or as not
being related to the Principles of Excellence. 85 The latter
category is for complaints that “focus[] on VA’s handling of
education benefits, [do] not involve the institution or employer,
[are] incoherent or spam,” or if the “[c]omplaint is a duplicate
of another.” 86 Serious or flagrant complaints include
accusations of “serious or significant fraud or abuse,” are
“[s]ubmitted by a whistleblower,” or are otherwise determined
to be serious by department staff. 87 In less than one year after
the program began, the Department of Veterans Affairs
received 2,254 complaints, of which 1,434 were based on the
Principles of Excellence. 88 These complaints led to forty-two
“targeted risk-based program reviews,” and as a result, two
federally-approved education programs were disqualified. 89

C. Pushback from FPIs

83. Id. at 25, 864; see supra footnotes 43–46 and accompanying text.
84. VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., GI BILL FEEDBACK SYSTEM 1 (January 2015),
https://www.benefits.va.gov/GIBILL/docs/Overview_GI%20Bill_Feedback%20System_CY14.
pdf.
85. Id. at 3.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1.
89. Id.
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With the new regulations in place, the federal
government has met opposition from the for-profit education
industry, especially in its lobbying arm Career Education
Colleges and Universities (“CECU”), formerly known as the
Association of Private Sector Colleges and Universities
(“APSCU”). 90 CECU represents five hundred member schools
that claim to pride themselves in providing “skills-based
education opportunities to nontraditional students, particularly
veterans, working mothers, and parents.” 91 In 2014, APSCU
filed a three-count, seventy-seven-page complaint against
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan, the Department of
Education, and the federal government as a whole. 92 The
lawsuit was in response to the Department of Education’s
promulgation of the Gainful Employment Rule. 93 The rule
“establish[ed] measures for determining whether certain
postsecondary educational programs prepare students for
gainful employment in a recognized occupation, and the
conditions under which these educational programs remain
eligible under the Federal Student Aid programs authorized
under Title IV of the HEA (Title IV, HEA programs).” 94
During the public comment period for the rule, “[o]ne
commenter expressed support on the basis that, by preventing
students from enrolling in low-performing programs, the
regulations would curb predatory recruiting practices that
target veterans in particular,” 95 and others expressed support

90. See CAREER EDUC. COLLS. & UNIVS., http://www.career.org/ (last visited Nov. 28,
2016); infra notes 85–102 and accompanying text; see also Complaint & Prayer for Declaratory
& Injunctive Relief, Cal. Ass’n of Private Postsecondary Sch. v. DeVos, No. 1:17-cv-00999
(D.D.C. filed May 24, 2017).
91. About Us, CAREER EDUC. COLLS. & UNIVS., http://www.career.org/about.html
(last visited Nov. 27, 2017).
92. See Complaint, Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d
176 (D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-01870-JDB).
93. Id. at 2; see Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 79 Fed. Reg. 64,890 (Oct. 31,
2014) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 600, 668).
94. Gainful Employment, supra note 93, at 64, 890.
95. Id. at 64, 896.
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based on the for-profit education industry’s high reliance on
veterans’ educational assistance programs compared to their
non-profit counterparts. 96
APSCU, on behalf of its 1,400 member institutions,
argued that the rule was a violation of the First Amendment, 97
Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 98 and the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) 99 because it was
“unlawful, arbitrary, and irrational, and [would] needlessly
harm millions of students who attend private sector colleges
and universities.” 100 According to the plaintiff, the Department
of Education unscrupulously “rel[ied] primarily on errorridden, partisan, and discredited sources” and “pursued the
proposed regulations with the singular premise of ‘cut[ting]
[for-profits] out . . . of federal aid.’” 101 They further contended
that the enabling legislation for the rule “requires only that
programs prepare student for employment that is gainful . . .
not that the students actually secure employment at certain
income levels relative to various measures of student debt.” 102
Because it believed the rule not only exceeded the
Department’s rulemaking authority, but was also arbitrary and
capricious and violated its “members’ right to free speech by
compelling them to speak in an unduly burdensome manner,”
APSCU sought the District Court for the District of Columbia
to declare the rule unlawful, postpone its effective date, and
award plaintiffs’ costs and attorneys’ fees. 103
In its motion for summary judgment, the government
argued that the Department “promulgated thoughtful

96. Id. at 64,903.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
98. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070–1099d (2012).
99. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706 (2012).
100. Complaint, supra note 92, at 2, 75–76.
101. Id. at 4 (quoting Roberto J. Rodriguez, Conference of Student Loans: Opening
Plenary Session (Oct. 24, 2013)).
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. at 75–76.
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regulations, aimed at a vexing problem in its area of expertise,
that demonstrate reasoned decision-making.” 104 The United
States Supreme Court discussed the standard of review for an
agency’s rulemaking in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of
the statute which it administers, it is confronted
with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute . . .
“The power of an administrative agency to
administer a congressionally created . . . program
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and
the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly
or explicitly, by Congress.” If Congress has
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is
an express delegation of authority to the agency
104. Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Their Cross-Motion for Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s
Mot. for Summ. J. at 2, Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176
(D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-01870-JDB) [hereinafter Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of
Summary Judgment].
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to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency
on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute
its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.
We have long recognized that considerable
weight should be accorded to an executive
department’s construction of a statutory scheme
it is entrusted to administer . . . . 105

Arguing that the rule was in the taxpayers’ best interests
because they bear the burden of defaults on student loans for
ineffective educational programs, the defendants asserted that
when the administrative agency’s enabling legislation is “silent
or ambiguous on the precise question at issue,” as was the case
here, the court “must uphold the agency’s construction of the
statute it administers so long as it is reasonable.” 106
Additionally, the defendant argued the rule was not arbitrary or
capricious under the APA because the Department “discussed
at length the connection between debt and earnings, and
students’ ability to repay their loans” and because “there is an
inherently rational connection between the quality of education
and training a program provides and the type of jobs its
students are able to obtain.” 107 Therefore, defendants noted, the

105. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984)
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
106. Def.s’ Cross-Motion for Summ. J. at 8, Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v.
Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176 (D.D.C. 2015) (No.14-1870).
107. Id.
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reasonable nature of the rule entitles the Department to
deference under Chevron. 108
The district court first analyzed the parties’ respective
arguments by addressing whether the Higher Education Act’s
phrase “‘prepare students for gainful employment in a
recognized occupation’ [has] a plain meaning that the
Department (and the Court) must simply implement? Or is this
language ambiguous such that the Court should accept the
Department’s interpretation—assuming, of course, that its
interpretation is a reasonable one?” 109 In its discussion of the
rule and previous case law, the court found that Congress’s
language was ambiguous and the Department could reasonably
interpret the provision in its promulgation of rules, which it
did. 110 The court next rejected APSCU’s arguments that the
rule was arbitrary and capricious 111:
[T]ry as it might, the Association has not shown
that the Department unreasonably interpreted an
ambiguous statutory command, nor has it proven
(despite at least a baker’s-dozen arguments) that
the debt-to-earnings portion of the Department’s
final “gainful employment” rule is arbitrary or
capricious or otherwise in violation of the APA. 112
In the apt words of Judge John Bates: “And that, as they
say, is that. The Department’s ‘gainful employment’
regulations—including the current debt-to-earnings test and
disclosure, reporting, and certification requirements—survive

108. Def.s’ Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J., supra note 103, at 19. See generally Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842–44.
109. Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 184
(D.D.C. 2015).
110. See id. at 184–92.
111. Id. at 191.
112. Id. at 198.
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this court challenge in their entirety . . . .” 113 The government’s
motion for summary judgment was thus granted. 114
V. NEED FOR FURTHER REFORM

A. Federal Executive Reform
Towards the end of his administration, President
Obama took significant action to curtail the abuse of American
veterans and the federal purse by the for-profit education
industry, but on January 20, 2017, Donald J. Trump became
the President of the United States. 115 President Trump has
criticized President Obama’s use of executive orders to
overcome gridlock in Congress, 116 but has also indicated that he
plans to use executive orders to do the same. 117 Because he
claims to be a strong supporter of veterans, 118 he may, under
that rationale, leave the Obama administration’s executive
orders regarding veterans issues alone. However, Secretary of
Education Betsy DeVos indicated in her confirmation hearing
that she may not continue the enforcement of federal
regulations enacted by the Obama administration for FPIs. 119 In
July 2017, the Department of Education announced that it
113. Id. at 204.
114. Order at 1, Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176
(2015) (No. 14-1870). (D.D.C. June 23, 2015).
115. Presidential Inauguration 2017, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/inauguration-2017
(last visited Nov. 30, 2016).
116. Timothy Noah & Cogan Schneier, Trump Poised to Erase Obama Policies,
POLITICO (Nov. 10, 2016, 5:14 AM). http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/trump-eraseobama-policies-231156. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Avoiding Gridlock Through
Unilateral Executive Action: The Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan, 7 WAKE FOREST
J.L. & POL’Y 141 (2017).
117. Bradford Richardson, Trump: Obama ‘Led the Way’ on Executive Orders, THE
HILL (Jan. 10, 2016, 12:14 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/265371-trumpobama-led-the-way-on-executive-orders.
118. See Veterans Affairs Reform, TRUMP PENCE MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! 2016,
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/ policies/veterans-affairs-reform (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).
119. David Halperin, DeVos Declines to Support For-Profit College Accountability
Rules, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 17, 2017 8:24 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/davidhalperin/devos-declines-to-support_b_14235348.html.

109

SALEMME.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BYU Journal of Public Law

1/19/2018 2:46 PM

[Vol. 32

would suspend the federal student loan debt forgiveness
program for students cheated by FPIs and the Obama
administration’s gainful employment mandate. 120 Secretary
DeVos has also been criticized for her close connections to the
for-profit education industry, which some believe will lead to
further deregulation of FPIs over the next three years. 121
In addition to the Department of Education’s support of
FPIs, in September 2017, the Department of Veterans Affairs
proposed a suspension of a fifty-year-old conflict-of-interest
law that prohibits its employees from having a financial interest
in FPIs. 122 The law requires the dismissal of any Department of
Veterans Affairs employee who during their employment
“owned any interest in, or received any wages, salary, dividends,
profits, gratuities, or services from, any educational institution
operated for profit in which an eligible person or veteran was
pursuing a program of education or course.” 123 However, the
agency contends “that statute has illogical and unintended
consequences, in that it requires the removal of any V.A.
employee who has any connection to” an FPI. 124 Opponents of
the regulation, including veterans’ groups and ethics experts,
disagree with the agency’s position, asserting that “‘no good . . .

120. Stacy Cowley & Patricia Cohen, Trump Administration Delays Rules on Abuses by
For-Profit Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2017, at B8; see also Danielle Douglas-Gabriel,
DeVos Rejects Invitation to Meet with Former For-Profit College Students, WASH. POST

(Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/09/28/devosrejects-invitation-to-meet-with-former-for-profit-college-students/?utm_term=.d86235c21efa.
121. See id.; John Bowden, Warren Accuses DeVos of Helping For-Profit Colleges
‘Swindle’ Students, The Hill (June 15, 2017, 6:48 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administr
ation/338056-warren-accuses-devos-of-helping-for-profit-colleges-swindle-students; Richard
North Patterson, Too Many For-Profit Colleges Defraud Students and Taxpayers Alike, BOS.
GLOBE (June 5, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/06/05/too-many-forprofit-colleges-defraud-students-and-taxpayers-alike/6jKnrUaLp9Ue1SPcgU4nUL/story.html.
122. Employees Whose Association with For-Profit Educational Institutions Poses No
Detriment to Veterans, 82 Fed. Reg. 43, 288 (Sept. 14, 2017).
123. 38 U.S.C. § 3683 (2012).
124. Employees Whose Association with For-Profit Educational Institutions Poses No
Detriment to Veterans, 82 Fed. Reg. at 43, 288.
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can come from allowing colleges to have unseemly financial
entanglements with V.A. employees.’” 125
Still, President Trump also has a controversial history of
involvement in the for-profit education industry. Trump
University, a company founded by Trump, was an FPI that
offered “courses in real estate, asset management,
entrepreneurship and wealth creation.” 126 According to a class
action complaint filed against Trump University in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California in
2010 by former students, “Trump University lure[d] consumers
in with a free introductory Seminar, which turn[ed] out to be
nothing more than an infomercial used to ‘up-sell’ and
persuade students to purchase its $1,495 ‘one year
apprenticeship’ course.” 127 The action was brought by plaintiffs
under the California Unfair Competition Law, 128 Consumer
Legal Remedies Act, 129 and False Advertising Law. 130 They
claimed breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, money had and received, negligent
misrepresentation, fraud, and false promises. 131 The plaintiffs
sought relief in the form of “refunding Plaintiff and class
members the full amount paid for Trump University Seminars;
an order enjoining Trump from falsely marketing and
advertising its Seminars;” and costs and attorneys’ fees. 132 The
lawsuit was eventually settled for $25 million in November
2016, less than two weeks after the general election. 133
125. Patricia Cohen, Veterans Agency Seeks to Scrap Ethics Law on For-Profit Colleges,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/29/business/veterans-affairsethics.html.
126. Class Action Compl. at 4; Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 3:10-cv-00940-GPCWVG (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2010).
127. Id. at 4.
128. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (Deering 2016).
129. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 (Deering 2016).
130. CAL. BUS. & PROF. Code § 17500 (Deering 2016).
131. Class Action Compl., supra note 126, at 2.
132. Id.
133. Steve Eder, Trump Settles University Suit for $25 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2016, at A1.
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The President’s history in the industry is not to say,
however, that he will hinder the work done by the Obama
administration to curb the predatory practices of FPIs as they
involve veterans. Rather, it emphasizes the pervasiveness of the
industry. In addition to maintaining and enforcing the
Principles of Excellence, 134 the executive branch can further
promulgate rules regarding access by FPIs to military
installations and federal veterans’ centers, educate veterans and
service members on the risks these institutions pose, and bolster
the enforcement of Department of Education regulations.
However, any substantial change will require congressional
intervention. 135

B. Legislative Reform
One approach to fixing the problems associated with the
90/10 Rule is for federal veteran education funding to be
included in the ninety percent allocation with other federal
funds. In June of 2015, Senator Thomas Carper of Delaware
introduced the Military and Veterans Education Protection
Act—a bill that precisely addresses the issue. 136 The bill was
referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions that month, where it remains today. 137 An
identical bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by
Representative Jackie Speier of California in November 2015
and now awaits passage in three committees, most recently
being referred to the Subcommittee on Higher Education and

134. See supra Part IV, Section B.
135. See generally Patton, supra note 71, at 446–49.
136. Military and Veterans Education Protection Act, S. 1664, 114th Cong. (1st Sess.
2015) (“A Bill [t]o count revenues from military and veteran education programs toward the
limit on Federal revenues that certain proprietary institutions of higher education are allowed
to receive for purposes of section 487 of the Higher Education Act of 1965, and for other
purposes.”).
137. S.1664 – Military and Veterans Education Protection Act, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1664 (last visited Dec. 12, 2016).
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Workforce Training of the House Committee on Education
and the Workforce on March 23, 2016. 138 This is not the first
time Senator Carper and Representative Speier have attempted
to pass this legislation, 139 and yet infamous congressional
gridlock prevails. 140 Further, other members of Congress have
introduced similar legislation with predictably similar results. 141
In September 2016, another attempt was made to
improve the federal government’s education assistance
programs for veterans. 142 Representative Mark Tanko of
California introduced the Supporting, Employing, and
Recognizing Veterans in Communities Everywhere Act
(“SERVICE Act”), an expansive piece of legislation that, among
other components, includes provisions to increase oversight of
disingenuous educational institutions and improve accountability of federal dollars spent on education benefits for
veterans. 143 For example, if enacted, the bill directs the
Inspector General of the Department of Veterans Affairs to
“apply heightened scrutiny” to any institution that has been
found to have used deceptive practices by any state or federal
agency and to provide notice to any students enrolled at that
institution who receive federal assistance of such scrutiny. 144 If,
after the heightened scrutiny is applied, the Secretary of the
Department finds that the institution has engaged in deceptive
practices, the institution will be formally disapproved by the
Department. 145 These provisions, in addition to striking the
138. H.R.3988 – Military and Veterans Education Protection Act, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3988/all-actions (last visited Dec. 12,
2016); see also Military and Veterans Education Protection Act, H.R. 3988, 114th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2015).
139. See Patton, supra note 71, at 448.
140. See generally McGarity, supra note 116.
141. Ensuring Quality Education for Veterans Act, H.R. 4054, 114th Cong. (1st Sess.
2015).
142. See Supporting, Employing, and Recognizing Veterans in Communities Everywhere
Act, H.R. 6062, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016).
143. Id.
144. Id. § 301.
145. Id. § 302.
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veteran-loophole of the 90/10 Rule, 146 are precisely the actions
that need to be taken to protect veterans and taxpayer money.
The Jeff Miller and Richard Blumenthal Veterans
Health Care and Benefits Improvement Act of 2016, 147 was
unanimously passed by the House of Representatives on
December 6, 2016, 148 and the Senate on December 10, 2016. 149
The omnibus bill contains numerous veterans-related
provisions and addresses some issues surrounding educational
assistance programs. 150 One such provision requires educational
institutions to provide annual progress reports of students from
whom they receive funds under the Post-9/11 GI Bill to the
Department of Veterans Affairs. 151 Concerning FPIs, the bill
transfers the approving authority of education programs not
subject to approval by the federal government to state
agencies. 152 Non-accredited programs must meet certain statemandated criteria in order to be approved by the federal
government unless the Secretary of the Department of
Veterans Affairs deems it necessary to expand such criteria in
particular situations. 153
Overall, the bill’s posture towards FPIs is almost
friendly. In fact, the bill adds language to Title 38 requiring the
Secretary, in administering heightened requirements for nonaccredited programs, to “treat public, private, and proprietary
for-profit educational institutions equitably.” 154 Also, notably
absent from this legislation is any mention of the 90/10 Rule,
146. See id. § 305.
147. Jeff Miller and Richard Blumenthal Veterans Health Care and Benefits
Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-315, 130 Stat. 1536.
148. H.R.6416 - Jeff Miller and Richard Blumenthal Veterans Health Care and Benefits
Improvement Act of 2016, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114thcongress/house-bill/6416/all-actions?overview=closed#tabs (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
149. Id.
150. See Jeff Miller and Richard Blumenthal Veterans Health Care and Benefits
Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-315, 130 Stat. 1536.
151. Id. § 404.
152. Id. § 408.
153. Id. § 410.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
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institutional abuses targeted at veterans, or any of the issues
raised by President Obama in the Principles of Excellence
program. 155 The bill was signed into law by President Obama at
the end of his term. Senator Johnny Isakson, Chairman of the
Senate Veterans Affairs Committee, called the legislation “a
down payment on . . . the debt that we owe to [our]
veterans.” 156
Most recently, President Trump signed into law the
Harry W. Colmery Veterans Educational Assistance Act of
2017, which expands educational benefits for veterans and assist
those veterans who fell victim to the predatory practices of ITT
Technical Institute and Corinthian Colleges. 157 While the
legislation, enacted on August 16, 2017, undoes some of the
deregulation of the industry by the Trump administration’s
Department of Education, it fails to protect future predation. 158
With the for-profit education industry generating millions of
dollars in revenue from veterans assistance programs, and in
turn spending that money on lobbyists and campaign
contributions to influence congressional leaders like the
Chairman of the House Committee on Education and the
Workforce, 159 the 90/10 Rule may continue to leave veterans
vulnerable to the industry’s corporate greed.

155. See Jeff Miller and Richard Blumenthal Veterans Health Care and Benefits
Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-315, 130 Stat. 1536
156. Leo Shane III, Congress Passes Slimmed-Down Veterans Reform Bill, MIL. TIMES
(Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/va-omnibus-passes-without-majorprovisions.
157. Harry W. Colmery Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2017, H.R. 3218 (1st
Sess. 2017); Alexa Liautaud & Christina Sterbenz, Trump’s “Forever GI Bill” Won’t Stop ForProfit Schools from Preying on Vets, VICE NEWS (Aug. 17, 2017),
https://news.vice.com/story/trumps-forever-gi-bill-wont-stop-for-profit-schools-from-preyingon-vets; Katie Lobosco, Congress Expands GI Bill, Helping Veterans Burned by For-Profit
Schools, CNN (Aug. 3, 2017, 3:28 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/03/pf/college/gi-billbenefits-for-profit/index.html.
158. Liautaud & Sterbenz, supra note 155.
159. In 2014, Representative John Kline, Chairman of the House Committee on
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